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COMPLEXITY AND CAUSATION

Tim Burke

'The relationship between cause and effect is one of the cen-

tral objects of investigation in most modern academic d
plines. Disciplines which are especially sensitive to or intere
in the passage of time are particularly concerned with causat
and of those, perhaps history most of all.
This is not to say that historical scholarship must necessari
focused on arguments about causation and causality. Many w
of history are more descriptive and aim to provide less a
count of the why of historical change than an account o
what of history. In a more elaborate vein, historical writing i
enced by postmodernism, particularly by the work of Michel
cault, remains wary of causal argument and its tendency to
for origins, preferring instead what Foucault called "geneal
a style of historical writing focused on process and develop
over time without recourse to causal arguments which si

themselves outside of or underneath the history being

described.1

Historians face some distinctive problems in dealing with causation. With the exception of economic or other quantitative historical research that is dealing with extremely rich and rigorously
collective data, most fields of historical study must make causal
arguments without the ability to repeat experiments and without
statistical tools like regression analysis that allow other disciplines
to select among a host of competing variables to isolate and describe the relative magnitude of various causes of observed effects. Causation for historians is largely a matter of persuasive
argument. As R.G. Collingwood put it, historians do not identify
events and then ponder their causes separately, as scientists do.
When a historian "knows what happened, he already knows why
Tim Burke is Associate Professor of History at Swarthmore College.
Soundings 90.1-2 (Spring/Summer 2007). ISSN 0038-1861.
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Broadly speaking, causal ar
mid-twentieth century hav
mate camps. The first set o
time, refer to underlying s

deterministic in nature. The second tend towards short scales of

time, refer to specific and granular events or episodes, and often
stress the relatively contingent or unintended nature of causality.
There are sophisticated strategies for integrating these levels of
analysis, such as Anthony Giddens's theory of "structuration" that
describes agency and structure as a dynamically recursive relation
in which the contingent or unpredictable actions affect the more
fixed or deterministic character of social structure, and vice-

versa, in an endless feedback loop.4 Even with such integrations
(not dissimilar to efforts by "compatibilist" philosophers to integrate free will and causal determinism), many individual historians still tend to prefer operating at one or the other scale of
causal explanation.5
In both cases, arguments about causation tend to run into seri-

ous problems. For the historian who emphasizes the vast expanses of time of the longue durée and the determinate role of
underlying structures, there is a fundamental question, posed
best by Salman Rushdie in his novel The Satanic Verses: How does
newness enter the world? If change over time is best understood
as determined by underlying and highly deterministic structures,
and best perceived in long scales, why should there ever be anything new in history? Why should there have been capitalism, or
the expansion of Western Europe, or the French Revolution?

There are a variety of ways to approach this basic problem.
One is to deny or deemphasize the extent to which anything is,
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in fact, new. For example, the social scientist Andre Gunder
Frank has argued that the seeming break in global economic and
political history that coincides with the rise of Western European
societies to worldwide domination after 1500 and the spread of
capitalism is largely an illusion, that there is only one global system which is 5,000 years old.6 Most specialized fields of historical
scholarship feature work with related strategies to de-emphasize
or even wholly erase a perceived break or disjuncture between
eras or systems, or which argue against the understood novelty of
particular events, a mode of historical writing which is sometimes
described as "revisionism." For example, the field of medieval Eu-

ropean history in recent years has engaged in a debate about
whether there was ever such a thing as "feudalism."7
Another argument is to reduce strongly the moments of genuine newness or novelty in global history to a small handful of
important eras, or possibly even to a single instance, in a per-

ceived divide between the modern and premodern eras of

human history. Perhaps one of the most fertile and intensely debated bodies of historical knowledge is concerned with the un-

derlying causes of modernity. The fewer the cases of actual

"newness," the less difficulty they pose for strongly deterministic,

large-scale accounts of causality, and the more that such novelty
can be represented as a kind of singularity, an unusual instance
of a large-scale contingent outcome arising from underlying social structures. Versions of this strategy would include strongly
teleological interpretations of history, most notably Marx's historical materialism. In this view, while there may be both new
eras or periods in the history of particular societies and even
short-term events which are novel or disjunctive, such newness
arises from deterministic forces which guide overall historical
change towards a predictable end. Relatedly, even non-Marxist
historians who emphasize the long-term determinate role of materialism sometimes argue that short-term and contingent technological, environmental, or biological events give rise to social,
cultural, economic, or political novelty within human societies.
An earthquake which strikes a large city at a particular moment

in its long-term evolution may produce far-reaching conse-

quences which would not have necessarily followed had a similar
earthquake struck the same city at a different historical moment.
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local scales of human interaction, and on the deliberate actions

of human agents, tend to go begging for true causal arguments
and often rely upon mere precedence. They simply assume, that
is, that the causal explanation for a given event is to be found in
the event which immediately preceded it. At this scale, explaining newness is no trouble at all: Human agents seem highly capa-

ble of invention or imagination; institutions and everyday

practice are demonstrably plastic; and events readily give rise to

unpredicted or unintended consequences. The historian's problem here is to explain continuity and repetition, to explain why
events should consistently turn in a particular direction across a
large spatial or temporal scale, or why similar patterns of historical change should appear in disparate locales or cases.
In both cases, moreover, historians who wish to talk about cau-

sation face a basic problem with the rhetorical form of historical
knowledge, which is almost invariably built around persuasive hu-

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 18:47:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Complexity and Causation 37

manistic writing. In such a format, crafting genuinely multivari-

able causal arguments is profoundly difficult. While most
historians recognize the intellectual danger posed by what Marc
Bloch called "the fetish of the single cause," in practice historical

argument at both the long and short scales of focus tends to
make causal claims in terms of a very small handful of discrete
events or underlying structures.8 Newly minted doctorates may

excel at entering into long-running debates and pronouncing
them to be "more complex" than previously appreciated, but
there are limits to this kind of gesture. A work of historical schol-

arship which pronounced a given event or effect to be irresolvably and infinitely multiple in its causation would add little to
what we know, unless it were a general philosophical assault on
all discussions of causality in historical study. At the same time,
most historians recognize that emphasizing one or several causes
(at whatever scale or level of determination) is ad arguendo, a necessary exaggeration or abstraction to permit the discussion to go

forward.

Emergence and Historical Causation

I believe that the phenomenon known as "emergence
body of associated concepts such as complexity, compl

tive systems, networks, and agent-based systems hold con

ble promise for thinking about causation in historica
These concepts cannot resolve any of the problems tha

described thus far. These difficulties are intrinsic to historical

reason and will always remain contentious. Emergence, however

casts some of these problems in a new light, or allows an ap-

proach from some new angles. In the long term, it may also offer
new forms of historical representation, new rhetorical or argumentative instruments. At the same time, emergence in historical
thought runs into exactly the same epistemological and practica
issues which sharply limit its potential usefulness in most, perhaps all, fields of human knowledge.
The simplest definition of emergence as a phenomenon is that

it is a process of change over time in which complex systems
patterns, or structures form in an unplanned or undesigned

manner from simple or disorganized initial conditions. Typically,
emergence results from the autonomous and simultaneous inter
action of a very large number of independent agents, each pos-
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The free software NetLogo is a good platform for simulating

emergence as a process. Let me describe one NetLogo simulation called "Termites." In it, there are two differently colored

dots, each one pixel on a computer screen. One dot is a "ter-

mite," the other a "stick." Both are randomly distributed at the
start of a simulation within an otherwise empty environment.
The sticks are merely environmental: They do not move or act.
The termites act, governed by a set of simple rules. Each step of
the simulation, they move one space in a random direction. If
they end their move proximate to a stick, they "pick it up" (indicated by the termite changing color) . If while carrying a stick,
they end their move next to yet another stick, they drop the stick.
That's more or less it. In any given simulation of "Termites," with
a random distribution of termites and sticks, the termites will

eventually build a single round "pile" of sticks. (The display in
NetLogo wraps around, so what may appear to be two "piles" at
the top and bottom of the screen are in fact a single one.) This
pile is a permanent feature of the environment once it appears:
It will never be pulled apart. No other pile or structure will appear. Its shape, once formed, is relatively stable. But the termites
don't have any instruction to create a pile. There is no master
agent governing their actions. There is no concept of a pile in

their rules or in the environment.

Fig.l Three stages of "Termites" in NetLogo

Some tangible or empirical examples of the concept of emergence or self-organizing systems include the movement of social
insects around obstacles, patterns of coordinated growth among
slime molds, the coordinated action of bird flocks in flight, and
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the formation of cloud patterns within Jupiter's atmosphere.
More contentiously, some scientists have argued that human consciousness, evolution, and the large-scale structure of matter in
the universe are all examples of emergent systems, where complex behavior or structures at one level have arisen from the in-

teractions of simple rules determining the behavior of many
autonomous agents or components at a lower level of
organization.
What should be clear from the outset, however, is that using
the concept of emergence in historical argument about causality
potentially offends (or possibly complements) both strongly deterministic and strongly contingent inclinations in historical writing. It may be easiest to see what this means through specific
examples and in so doing, begin to sketch which kinds of historical phenomenon are most richly served through the use of the
concept. Let me start with a simple example: the technological
history of the videotape player, most particularly, the eventual
triumph of the VHS format over its rival Betamax format. This is

an example which has drawn considerable interest from economic historians, historians of technology, and economists because most observers consider the Beta format to have been

technologically superior in many respects to VHS. As one gro
of scholars describes it, this story has some familiar elements t
in the context of business history: the relation between "firs
movers" and later entrants to the market, the influence of mar-

keting strategies, and the struggle to establish technological stan-

dards.9 Given that both formats had the backing of sizeable
corporations with considerable power to influence consumer behavior, this cannot be seen as a "pure" case of emergence (and
indeed, in human history, I would argue that no event or phenomenon could ever be so). But the end result in many ways
seems unpredictable from the initial entry of Beta format into
the marketplace. This result was produced by the simultaneous
activities of many autonomous agents ranging from marketers to
consumers. The crystallization of preference for the VHS gave
rise to a new kind of complexity in media consumption practices
and ownership which no institution or interest controlled or anticipated at the outset of the introduction of the technology. In
general, the concept of emergence seems to be particularly helpful in understanding the history of technology. For example, it
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known.11 The differences between the social formations and la-

bor systems in the two cases are substantial. Gold mining in
South Africa was an important root of racial segregation and
apartheid. The system treated workers as migrants who lived
under tight control in guarded compounds during the term of
their labor contract, and they were compelled to return to distant rural home areas when they were not working in the mines.
Copper mining in northern Zambia and southern Congo, in contrast, relied upon "stabilized" labor, workers who lived with their
families in permanent urban communities built by the mining
companies around the sites of the mines themselves. It is possible
to understand this difference in deterministic (often materialistic) terms. Gold mining in South Africa required lots of cheap
but unskilled labor due in part to the nature of the gold deposits
themselves and also, before the end of the gold standard in 1931,
to the fixed price of gold in the world market. Copper mining
required skilled labor, and the prices for copper were relatively
favorable as African production was growing in size in the 1940's
and 1950's. It is also possible to see the difference as a temporal

one (that copper mine management had learned some lessons

from the problems of the labor system on South African gold
mines) or as an ideological one. (There were few white residents
around the copper mines, but many in the Witwatersrand in
South Africa.)

Thinking about both systems as emergent phenomena does
not displace the explanatory value of these arguments, but it
does add a useful element to the comparison. The compound
system of South Africa's gold mines, for example, stems in part
from the earlier development of diamond mining. Some of the
controls on African workers in diamond compounds were governmental concessions to individual white prospectors who were
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using the cheap labor provided by a system of apartheid as a
hedge against very thin economic margins (as also happened in
California when prospectors needed cheap migrant labor after
the initial wave of the 1849 gold rush). Other controls, such as
putting iron gloves on African miners when they ascended from
the diamond mines, were crude attempts to deal with the prob-

lem of diamond smuggling, but quickly metamorphosed into
more expansive systems of social control. Some aspects of the
South African migrant labor system of 1900 could legitimately be
said to be the compounded results of hasty improvisations and
idiosyncratic initiatives during the initial development of industrial mining in that area. Equally, "stabilization" as a policy in the

Copperbelt could be attributed to the intellectual and managerial backgrounds of key planners and executives involved in the
initial development of the copper mines, and these backgrounds
were, in turn, the product of industrial sociology in Europe and
the United States during that era.
There are numerous examples of historical events, at varying
levels of scale, that could be illuminated by a consideration of the
role of small or incremental actions by many agents working in-

dependently of one another in creating larger and more complex systems that none of the actors intended to create. For
instance, various treatments of "proto-industrialization" in Western Europe,12 such as Pat Hudson's study of wool textile produc-

tion in England in the eighteenth century,13 suggest that the
transition to industrial capitalism was marked by a complex relation between quite different but successful systems of producing.
In the Hudson case studies, there was a complex interaction between technologically and industrially oriented "worsted" industry and a more artisinal woolen industry, with the latter often
surprisingly outpacing the productivity of the former. Hudson's
analysis seems to me to reveal the emergent character of the industrial system of textile production. The history of these two sys-

tems is in some sense the contingent and unplanned result of

their interaction over time.

At an even higher level of scale and abstraction, I would argue
that there are perennial theoretical questions in historical scholarship that benefit from a consideration of emergence and com-

plexity. In my own recent work, I have been arguing for a
reinterpretation of causal roots of the "new imperialism" of the
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thing" which displaces all other frameworks or empirical knowledge. More importantly, if some of the bureaucratic and political
processes characteristic of indirect rule in Africa were emergent
phenomena, how did they become systematic, converging simultaneously out of many different localities into a single large struc-

ture of political power? Emergence theory as a way of thinking
about causality really shines in answering such questiongs, because it is centrally concerned with processes in which organization emerges from relative chaos, in which complex structures
arise from simpler and more inchoate practices. If one thinks
about imperial administrators, African elites, peasants, white
farmers, and other discrete groups of agents in early colonial Africa as having "rulesets" that shaped their actions (much as the
"termites" in NetLogo), it is quite possible to see how the simultaneous interactions of their differing priorities could converge
into a large-scale system without any of the actors necessarily intending to create that system (again, much as the "termites" in
NetLogo create a circular pile).
There are many large-scale events in human history that might
similarly benefit from incorporating notions of emergence into
debates about the causal roots of those events. Events which are

characterized by seemingly sharp and expansive discontinuities
or transformations of social, economic and political life over a
short span of time seem especially suited to this approach. The
evolution of the French Revolution from the world of Parisian

salons, rural discontent, and aristocratic decline in the late ancien
regime of France to the tumult and uncertainty of the initial over-

throw of the monarchy and then to the Terror has been endlessly
analyzed by historians. Many have sought to relate the Revolution
to deep and relatively deterministic structural causes and others
arguing for the relatively novel (but deliberate) character of the
Revolution. Surely at least some of the story is equally well-de-

scribed as emergent, about the unintended consequences of divergent activities by many pre-revolutionary actors in France, with

the excesses of the Terror being as much a surprise and puzzle to
the participants (and yet completely comprehensible as an emergent consequence of the earlier history) as to any later observers.

Is emergence theory simply one more analytic perspective in
the spectrum of approaches historians can employ? Perhaps, but
even if not, it is a significant enough good in its own right. Emer-
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are highly plausible (say, for example, Lee winning at Gettysburg) , the chain of counterfactual assertions becomes very difficult to follow as it progresses from a single difference to larger
and larger scales of historical transformation. From Gettysburg, it
is relatively easy to get to a victory for the South in the Civil War.

But from a victory for the South, it is quite difficult to go any
further. Could a slave system of agricultural production have survived the competitive force of Northern industrial capitalism? Or
survived its own internal pressures? Could the South have maintained political cohesion? The emergence model, however, does

not measure the relationship between initial conditions and
structural outcomes through single chains of causality, but

through the massive simultaneity of agents acting independently
of one another within a constrained environment or space. I can
imagine, if only as an experiment, a "counterfactual engine" or
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agent-based simulation-machine which could allow a historian to
model or describe divergent historical outcomes involving hundreds or thousands of variables in motion at once.17

In this respect, the introduction of emergence to arguments
about historical causality functions similarly to the intervention
of Stephen Jay Gould into evolutionary theory in his book Wonderful Life, which contends that the evolutionary process is shaped

a great deal by accident and contingency.18 The key thing about
Gould's argument is that it relates contingency at the microscale
of organisms and their composition to the macroscale of evolution and ecosystems as a whole. In history, scholars who place
emphasis on contingency and agency often tend to do so against
large-scale forms of determinism, asserting the autonomy of the
individual and collective human subject and the importance of

variable outcomes that derive from choice or willful action.

Emergence does not reject that emphasis, but it puts that k

contingency back into a new kind of relation to outcom
larger scales.

However, this relation is also the conceptual Achilles heel of
emergence and complexity theory. Emergence occurs when
many agents and forces acting simultaneously within a constrained environment give rise to some new complex structure
which then alters the environment within which those agents
carry out their activities. When historians try to make causal argu-

ments by focusing on a single variable, or a small handful of vari-

ables, most would concede that they argue reductively out of

necessity. Most of us know that the world is more complicated
than that, but it is very difficult to describe the causal relationship between two equally complex states with all the many vari-

ables that comprise them kept in view at once. Some kind of
reductionism is an intellectual and rhetorical requirement.
Emergence attractively envisions an asymmetrical relationship
between one relatively simple state of affairs and a consequently
more complex one: It gets to have its reductionist cake, but eat it
too, to pose a dynamic causal relationship between simplicity and
complexity, agency and structure.

An emergent view of indirect rule in Africa or the French
Revolution can hold that simple, unintentional, and simultaneous interactions between a heterogeneous collection of human
agents and institutions could give rise to novel large-scale politi-
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